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Abstract
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA)
protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In
particular, we prove that:
1. BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the
end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
2. BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round
with probability at most 1−Θ(1).
3. For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plau-
sible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions
terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)].
The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key
infrastructure (PKI).
The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS’17) that tolerates
up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability.
Keywords: Byzantine agreement; lower bound; round complexity.
∗Boston University and Northeastern University. E-mail: rancohen@ccs.neu.edu. Research supported by the
Northeastern University Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute Post-doctoral fellowship, IARPA under award 2019-
19020700009 (ACHILLES), NSF grant TWC-1664445, NSF grant 1422965, and by the NSF MACS project. Some of
this work was done while the author was a post-doc at Tel Aviv University, supported by ERC starting grant 638121.
†School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University. E-mail: iftachh@cs.tau.ac.il. Member of the Israeli Center
of Research Excellence in Algorithms (ICORE) and the Check Point Institute for Information Security.
‡Department of Computer Science, Technion. E-mail: n.makriyannis@gmail.com. Research supported by ERC
advanced grant 742754.
§School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University. E-mail: matanorland@mail.tau.ac.il.
¶Research supported by ERC starting grant 638121.
‖School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
E-mail: salex@cs.huji.ac.il. Research partially supported by ISF grant 1724/15.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Our Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Locally Consistent Security to Malicious Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Additional Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Our Techniques 8
2.1 First-Round Halting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Second-Round Halting – Arbitrary Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Second-Round Halting – Public-Randomness Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Our Lower Bounds 14
3.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 The Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 The Combinatorial Conjecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Lower Bounds on First-Round Halting 18
4.1 Proving Lemma 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 Lower Bounds on Second-Round Halting 21
5.1 Arbitrary Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2 Public-Randomness Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1 Introduction
Byzantine agreement (BA) [55, 42] is one of the most important problems in theoretical computer
science. In a BA protocol, a set of n parties wish to jointly agree on one of the honest parties’ input
bits. The protocol is t-resilient if no set of t corrupted parties can collude and prevent the honest
parties from completing this task. In the closely related problem of broadcast, all honest parties must
agree on the message sent by a (potentially corrupted) sender. Byzantine agreement and broadcast
are fundamental building blocks in distributed computing and cryptography, with applications in
fault-tolerant distributed systems [14, 41], secure multiparty computation [60, 31, 8, 15], and more
recently, blockchain protocols [16, 30, 54].
In this work, we consider the synchronous communication model, where the protocol proceeds
in rounds. It is well known that in the plain model, without any trusted setup assumptions, BA
and broadcast can be solved if and only if t < n/3 [55, 42, 25, 28]. Assuming the existence of
digital signatures and a public-key infrastructure (PKI), BA can be solved in the honest-majority
setting t < n/2, and broadcast under any number of corruptions t < n [21]. Information-theoretic
variants that remain secure against computationally unbounded adversaries exist using information-
theoretic pseudo-signatures [56].
An important aspect of BA and broadcast protocols is their round complexity. Deterministic
t-resilient protocols require at least t+1 rounds [24, 21], which is a tight lower bound [21, 28]. The
breakthrough results of Ben-Or [6] and Rabin [57] showed that this limitation can be circumvented
using randomization. In particular, Rabin [57] used random beacons (common random coins that
are secret-shared among the parties in a trusted setup phase) to construct a BA protocol resilient
to t < n/4 corruptions. Rabin’s protocol fails with probability 2−r after r rounds, and requires
expected constant number of rounds to reach agreement. This line of research culminated with
the work of Feldman and Micali [23] who showed how to compute the common coins from scratch,
yielding expected-constant-round BA protocol in the plain model, resilient to t < n/3 corruptions.
Katz and Koo [39] gave an analogue result in the PKI-model for the honest-majority case. Recent
results used trusted setup and cryptographic assumptions to establish a surprisingly small expected
round complexity, namely 9 for t < n/3 [46] and 10 for t < n/2 [47, 2].
The expected-constant-round protocols mentioned above are guaranteed to terminate (with
negligible error probability) within a poly-logarithmic number of rounds. The lower bounds on the
guaranteed termination from [24, 21] were generalized by [18, 38], showing that any randomized
r-round protocol must fail with probability at least (c · r)−r for some constant c. However, to date
there is no lower bound on the expected round complexity of randomized BA.
In this work, we tackle this question and show new lower bounds for randomized BA. To make
the discussion more informative, we consider a more explicit definition that bounds the halting
probability within a specific number of rounds. A lower bound based on such a definition readily
implies a lower bound on the expected round complexity of the BA protocol.
1.1 The Model
We start with describing in more details the model in which our lower bounds are given. In the
BA protocols considered in this work, the parties are communicating over a synchronous network
of private and authenticated channels. Each party starts the protocol with an input bit and
upon completion decides on an output bit. The protocol is t-resilient if when facing t colluding
parties that attack the protocol it holds that: (1) all honest parties agree on the same output bit
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(agreement), and (2) if all honest parties start with the same input bit, then this is the common
output bit (validity). The protocols might have a trusted setup phase: a trusted external party
samples correlated values and distributes them between the parties. A setup phase is known to be
essential for tolerating t ≥ n/3 corruptions, and seems to be crucial for highly efficient protocols
such as [46, 16, 47, 2, 1]. The trusted setup phase is typically implemented using (heavy) secure
multiparty computation [10, 12], via a public-key infrastructure, or with a random oracle (that can
be used to model proof of work) [53].
Locally consistent adversaries. The attacks presented in the paper require very limited capa-
bilities from the corrupted parties (a limitation that makes our bounds stronger). Specifically, a
corrupted party might (1) prematurely abort, and (2) send messages to different parties based on
differing input bits and/or incoming messages from other corrupted parties (see Section 3.1.2 for a
precise definition). We emphasize that corrupted parties sample their random coins honestly (and
use the same coins for all messages sent). In addition, they do not lie about messages received from
honest parties.
Public-randomness protocols. In many randomized protocols, including all those used in prac-
tice, cryptography is merely used to provide message authentication—preventing a party from lying
about the messages it received—and verifiable randomness—forcing the parties to toss their coins
correctly. The description of such protocols can be greatly simplified if only security against locally
consistent adversaries is required (in which corrupted parties do not lie about their coin tosses and
their incoming messages from honest parties). This motivates the definition of public-randomness
protocols, where each party publishes its local coin tosses for each round (the party’s first message
also contains its setup parameter, if such exists). Although our attacks apply to arbitrary BA
protocols, we show even stronger lower bounds for public-randomness protocols.
We illustrate the simplicity of the model by considering the BA protocol of Micali [46]. In this
protocol, the cryptographic tools, digital signatures and verifiable random functions (VRFs),1 are
used to allow the parties elect leaders and toss coins with probability 2/3 as follows: each party Pi
in round r evaluates the VRF on the pair (i, r) and multicasts the result. The leader is set to be the
party with the smallest VRF value, and the coin is set to be the least-significant bit of this value.
Since these values are uniformly distributed κ-bit strings (κ is the security parameter), and there
are at least 2n/3 honest parties, the success probability is 2/3. (Indeed, with probability 1/3, the
leader is corrupted, and can send its value only to a subset of the parties, creating disagreement.)
When considering locally consistent adversaries, Micali’s protocol can be significantly simplified
by having each party randomly sample and multicast a uniformly distributed κ-bit string (crypto-
graphic tools and setup phase are no longer needed). Corrupted parties can still send their values
to a subset of honest parties as before, but they cannot send different random values to different
honest parties.
A similar simplification applies to other BA protocols that are based on leader election and
coin tosses such as [23, 26, 39] (private channels are used for a leader-election sub-protocol), [47, 2]
(cryptography is used for coin-tossing and message-authentication), and [16, 1] (cryptography is
used to elect a small committee per round).2
1A pseudorandom function that provides a non-interactively verifiable proof for the correctness of its output.
2Unlike the aforementioned protocols that use “simple” preprocess and “light-weight” cryptographic tools, the
protocol of Rabin [57] uses a heavy, per execution, setup phase (consisting of Shamir sharing of a random coin for
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Proposition 1.1 (Malicious security to locally consistent public-randomness protocol, informal).
Each of the BA protocols of [23, 26, 39, 46, 16, 47, 2, 1] induces a public-randomness BA protocol
secure against locally consistent adversaries, with the same parameters.
A useful abstraction for protocol design. To complete the picture, we remark that security
against locally consistent adversaries, which may seem somewhat weak at first sight, can be compiled
using standard cryptographic techniques into security against arbitrary adversaries. This reduction
becomes lossless, efficiency-wise and security-wise, when applied to public-randomness protocols.
Thus, building public-randomness protocols secure against locally consistent adversaries is a useful
abstraction for protocol designers that want to use what cryptography has to offer, but without
being bothered with the technical details. See more details in Section 1.3.
Connection to the full-information model. The public-randomness model can be viewed
as a restricted form of the full-information model [17, 7, 32, 5, 9, 33, 37, 43, 40, 44]. In the
latter model, the adversary is computationally unbounded and has complete access to all the
information in the system, i.e., it can listen to all transmitted messages and view the internal
states of honest parties (such an adversary is also called intrusive [17]). One of the motivations to
study full-information protocols is to separate randomization from cryptography and see to what
extent randomization alone can speed up Byzantine agreement. Bar-Joseph and Ben-Or [5] showed
that any full-information BA protocol tolerating t = Θ(n) adaptive, fail-stop corruptions (i.e., the
adversary can dynamically choose which parties to crash) runs for Ω˜(
√
n) rounds. Goldwasser
et al. [33] constructed an O(log n)-round BA protocol tolerating t = (1/3 − ε)n static, malicious
corruptions, for an arbitrarily small constant ε > 0.
We chose to state our results in the public-randomness model for two reasons. First, our
lower bounds readily extend to lower bounds in the full-information model (since we consider
weaker adversarial capabilities, e.g., all our attacks are efficient). Second, when considering locally
consistent adversaries, public-randomness captures essentially what efficient cryptography has to
offer. Indeed, all protocol used in practice can be cast as public-randomness protocols tolerating
locally consistent adversaries (Proposition 1.1) and every public-randomness protocol secure against
locally consistent adversaries can be compiled, using cryptography, to malicious security in the
standard model, where security relies on secret coins (see Theorem 1.6 below).
We note that it is known how to compile certain full-information protocols and “boost”
their security from fail-stop into malicious; however, these compilers capture either determin-
istic protocols [35, 13, 51] or protocols with a non-uniform source of randomness (namely, an
SV-source [58]) [33]. It is unclear whether these compilers can be extended to capture arbitrary
protocols (this is in fact stated as an open question in [13, 33]). In addition, these compilers are
designed to be information theoretic and not rely on cryptography; thus, they do not model highly
efficient protocols used in practice.
1.2 Our Results
We present three lower bounds on the halting probability of randomized BA protocols. To keep
the following introductory discussion simple, we will assume that both validity and agreement
properties hold perfectly, without error.
every potential round) that we do not know how to cast as a public-randomness protocol.
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First-round halting. Our first result bounds the halting probability after a single communica-
tion round. This is the simplest case since parties cannot inform each other about inconsistencies
they encounter. Indeed, the established lower bound is quite strong, showing an exponentially small
bound on the halting probability when t ≥ n/3, and exponentially close to 1/2 when t ≥ n/4.
Theorem 1.2 (First-round halting, informal). Let Π be an n-party BA protocol and let γ denote the
halting probability after a single communication round facing a locally consistent, static, adversary
corrupting t parties. Then,
• t ≥ n/3 implies γ ≤ 2t−n for arbitrary protocols, and γ = 0 for public-randomness protocols.
• t ≥ n/4 implies γ ≤ 1/2 + 2t−n for arbitrary protocols, and γ ≤ 1/2 for public-randomness
protocols.
Note that the deterministic (t+ 1)-round, t-resilient BA protocol of Dolev and Strong [21] can
be cast as a locally consistent public-randomness protocol (in the plain model).3 Theorem 1.2
shows that for n = 3 and t = 1, this two-round BA protocol is essentially optimal and cannot be
improved via randomization (at least without considering complex protocols that cannot be cast
as public-randomness protocols).
Second-round halting for arbitrary protocols. Our second result considers the halting prob-
ability after two communication rounds. This is a much more challenging regime, as honest parties
have time to detect inconsistencies in first-round messages. Our bound for arbitrary protocols in
this case is weaker, and shows that when t > n/4, the halting probability is bounded away from 1.
Theorem 1.3 (Second-round halting, arbitrary protocols, informal). Let Π be an n-party BA
protocol and let γ denote the halting probability after two communication rounds facing a locally
consistent, static, adversary corrupting t = (1/4 + ε) · n parties. Then, γ ≤ 1− (ε/5)2.
Second-round halting for public-randomness protocols. Theorem 1.3 bounds the second-
round halting probability of arbitrary BA protocols away from one. For public-randomness protocol
we achieve a much stronger bound. The attack requires adaptive corruptions (as opposed to static
corruptions in the previous case) and is based on a combinatorial conjecture that is stated below.4
Theorem 1.4 (Second-round halting, public-randomness protocols, informal). Let Π be an n-party
public-randomness BA protocol and let γ denote the halting probability after two communication
rounds facing a locally consistent adversary adaptively corrupting t parties. Then, for sufficiently
large n and assuming Conjecture 1.5 holds,
• t > n/3 implies γ = 0.
• t > n/4 implies γ ≤ 1/2.
3When considering locally consistent adversaries, the impossibility of BA for t ≥ n/3 does not apply.
4The attack holds even without assuming Conjecture 1.5 when considering strongly adaptive corruptions [34], in
which an adversary sees all messages sent by honest parties in any given round and, based on the messages’ content,
decides whether to corrupt a party (and alter its message or sabotage its delivery) or not. Similarly, the conjecture
is not required if each party is limited to tossing a single unbiased coin. These extensions are not formally proved in
this paper.
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Theorem 1.4 shows that for sufficiently large n, any public-randomness protocol tolerating
t > n/3 locally consistent corruptions cannot halt in less than three rounds (unless Conjecture 1.5
is false). In particular, its expected round complexity must be at least three.
To understand the meaning of this result, recall the protocol of Micali [46]. As discussed above,
this protocol can be cast as a public-randomness protocol tolerating t < n/3 adaptive locally
consistent corruptions. The protocol proceeds by continuously running a three-round sub-protocol
until halting, where each sub-protocol consists of a coin-tossing round, a check-halting-on-0 round,
and a check-halting-on-1 round. Executing a single instance of this sub-protocol demonstrates a
halting probability of 1/3 after three rounds. By Theorem 1.4, a protocol that tolerates slightly
more corruptions, i.e., (1/3 + ε) · n, for arbitrarily small ε > 0, cannot halt in fewer rounds.
Our techniques. Our attacks follow the spirit of many lower bounds on the round complexity
on BA and broadcast [24, 21, 38, 22, 29, 4]. The underlying idea is to start with a configuration
in which validity assures the common output is 0, and gradually adjust it, while retaining the
same output value, into a configuration in which validity assures the common output is 1. (For
the simple case of deterministic protocols, each step of the argument requires the corrupted parties
to lie about their input bits and incoming messages from other corrupted parties, but otherwise
behave honestly.) Our main contribution, which departs from the aforementioned paradigm, is
adding another dimension to the attack by aborting a random subset of parties (rather than simply
manipulating the input and incoming messages). This change allows us to bypass a seemingly
inherent barrier for this approach. We refer the reader to Section 2 for a detailed overview of our
attacks.
We remark that a similar approach was employed by Attiya and Censor [3] for obtaining lower
bounds on consensus protocols in the asynchronous shared-memory model, a flavor of BA in a
communication model very different to the one considered in the present paper. Specifically, [3]
showed that in an asynchronous shared-memory system, Θ(n2) steps are required for n processors
to reach agreement when facing Θ(n) computationally unbounded strongly adaptive corruptions (see
Footnote 4). Their adversary also aborts a subset of the parties to prevent halting; however, the
difference in communication model (synchronous in our work, vs. asynchronous in [3]) and the
adversary’s power (efficient and adaptive in our work, vs. computationally unbounded and strongly
adaptive in [3]) yields a very different attack and analysis (though, interestingly, both attacks boil
down to different variants of isoperimetric-type inequalities).
The combinatorial conjecture. We conclude the present section by motivating and stating the
combinatorial conjecture assumed in Theorem 1.4, and discussing its plausibility. We believe the
conjecture to be of independent interest, as it relates to topics from Boolean functions analysis such
as influences of subsets of variables [52] and isoperimetric-type inequalities [49, 50]. The nature
of our conjecture makes the following paragraphs somewhat technical, and reading them can be
postponed until after going over the description of our attack in Section 2.
The analysis of our attack naturally gives rise to an isoperimetric-type inequality. For limited
types of protocols, we manage to prove it using Friedgut’s theorem [27] about approximate juntas
and the KKL theorem [36]. For arbitrary protocols, however, we only manage to reduce our attack
to the conjecture below.
We require the following notation before stating the conjecture. Let Σ denote some finite set.
For x ∈ Σn and S ⊆ [n], define the vector ⊥S(x) ∈ {Σ ∪ ⊥}n by assigning all entries indexed by
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S with the value ⊥, and all other entries according to x. Finally, let Dn,σ denote the distribution
induced over subsets of [n] by choosing each element with probability σ independently at random.
Conjecture 1.5. For any σ, λ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that the following holds for large enough
n ∈ N: let Σ be a finite alphabet, and let A0,A1 ⊆ {Σ ∪ ⊥}n be two sets such that for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Σn
[r,⊥S(r) ∈ Ab] ≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ.
Then,
Pr
S←Dn,σ
r←Σn
[∀b ∈ {0, 1} : {r,⊥S(r)} ∩ Ab 6= ∅] ≥ δ.
Consider two large sets A0 and A1 which are “stable” in the following sense: for both b ∈ {0, 1},
with probability 1−δ over S ← Dn,σ, it holds that both r and ⊥S(r) belong to Ab, with probability
at least λ over r. Conjecture 1.5 stipulates that with high probability (≥ δ), the vectors r and
⊥S(r) lie in opposite sets (i.e., one is in A0 and the other A1−b), for random r and S. It is somewhat
reminiscent of the following flavor of isoperimetric inequality: for any two large sets B0 and B1,
taking a random element from B0 and resampling a few coordinates, yields an element in B1 with
large probability. Less formally, one can “move” from one set to the other by manipulating a few
coordinates [49, 50].
A few remarks are in order. First, it suffices for our purposes to show that δ is a noticeable
(i.e., inverse polynomial) function of n, rather than independent of n.5 We opted for the latter as
it gives a stronger attack. Second, the conjecture holds for “natural” sets such as balls, i.e., A0
and A1 are balls centered around 0n and 1n of constant radius,6 and “prefix” sets, i.e., sets of the
form Ab = bk × {Σ ∪ ⊥}n−k. Furthermore, the claim can be proven when the probabilities over S
and r are reversed, i.e., “with probability λ over r, it holds that both r and ⊥S(r) belong to Ab
with probability at least 1 − δ over S”, instead of the above. Interestingly, this weaker statement
boils down to the aforementioned isoperimetric-type inequality (c.f. [49] for the Boolean case and
[50] for the non Boolean case).
We conclude by pointing out that, as mentioned in Footnote 4, the conjecture is not needed
for certain limited cases that are not addressed in detail in the present paper. One such case is
sketched out in Section 2.
1.3 Locally Consistent Security to Malicious Security
As briefly mentioned in Section 1.1, protocols that are secure against locally consistent adversaries
can be compiled to tolerate arbitrary malicious adversaries. The compiler requires a PKI for digital
signatures and verifiable random functions (VRFs) [48]. A VRF is a pseudorandom function with
an additional property: using the secret key and an input x, the VRF outputs a pseudorandom
value y along with a proof string π; using the public key, everyone can use π to verify whether y
is the output of x. We consider a trusted setup phase for establishing the PKI, where every party
generates keys for a VRF and for a signature scheme, and publishes the corresponding public keys.
5We remark that it is rather easy to show that δ ≥ 2−n, which is not good enough for our purposes.
6The alphabet Σ is not necessarily Boolean, and there are a couple of subtleties in defining balls.
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Given a protocol that is secure against locally consistent adversaries, the compiled protocol
proceeds as follows, round by round. Each party Pi sets its random coins for the r’th round ρ
r
i
(together with a proof πri ) by evaluating the VRF over the pair (i, r). Next, for every j ∈ [n], party
Pi uses these coins to compute the message m
r
i→j for Pj , signs m
r
i→j along with the VRF proof π
r
i
as σri→j, and sends (m
r
i→j, π
r
i , σ
r
i→j) to Pj . Finally, Pi proves to each Pj using a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge that:
1. There exist an input bit b, random coins ρri , as well as random coins and incoming messages
ρr
′
i and (m
r′
1→i, . . . ,m
r′
n→i) for every r
′ < r, such that: (1) πri verifies that ρ
r
i is the VRF
output of (i, r) (using the VRF public key of Pi), and (2) the message m
r
i→j is the output of
the next-message function of Pi when applied to these values.
2. For every r′ < r, the input bit b and the random coins ρr
′′
i and incoming messages
(mr
′′
1→i, . . . ,m
r′′
n→i) for every r
′′ < r′, are the same as those used to generate mr
′
i→j.
3. For r > 1, the messages received in the previous round are properly signed. That is, for
every k ∈ [n], there is a signature σr−1k→i of the message mr−1k→i that verifies under the signature-
verification key of Pk.
When considering public-randomness protocols, the above compilation can be made much more
efficient. Instead of proving in zero knowledge the consistency of each message, each party Pi
concatenates to each message all of its incoming messages from the previous round. A receiver can
now locally verify the coins used by Pi are the VRF output of (i, r) (as assured by the VRF), that
the incoming messages are properly signed, and that the message is correctly generated from the
internal state of Pi (which is now visible and verified).
Theorem 1.6 (Locally consistent to malicious security, folklore, informal). Assume PKI for dig-
ital signatures and VRF, then a BA protocol secure against locally consistent adversaries, can be
compiled into a maliciously secure BA protocol with the same parameters, apart from a constant
blowup in the round complexity (no blowup for public-randomness protocols).
1.4 Additional Related Work
Following the work of Feldman and Micali [23] in the two-thirds majority setting, Katz and Koo [39]
improved the expected round complexity to 23, and Micali [46] to 9. In the honest-majority setting,
Fitzi and Garay [26] showed expected-constant-round protocol and Katz and Koo [39] expected 56
rounds. Micali and Vaikuntanathan [47] adjusted the technique from [46] to the honest-majority
case. Abraham et al. [2] achieved expected 10 rounds assuming static corruptions and expected 16
rounds assuming adaptive corruptions. Abraham et al. [1] constructed an expected-constant-round
protocol tolerating (1/2− ǫ) · n adaptive corruptions with sublinear communication complexity. In
the dishonest-majority setting, Garay et al. [29] constructed a broadcast protocol with expected
O(k) rounds, tolerating t < n/2 + k corruptions.
Attiya and Censor-Hillel [4] extended the results of Chor et al. [18] and of Karlin and Yao [38]
on guaranteed termination of randomized BA protocols to the asynchronous setting, and provided
a tight lower bound.
Randomized protocols with expected constant round complexity have probabilistic termination,
which requires delicate care with respect to composition (i.e., their usage as subroutines by higher-
level protocols). Parallel composition of randomized BA protocols was analyzed in [6, 26], sequential
composition in [45], and universal composition in [19, 20].
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1.5 Open Questions
Our attack on two-round halting of public-randomness protocols is based on Conjecture 1.5. In
this work we prove special cases of this conjecture, but proving the general case remains an open
challenge.
A different interesting direction is to bound the halting probability of protocols when t < n/4.
It is not clear how to extend our attacks to this regime.
Paper Organization
In Section 2 we present a technical overview of our attacks. The formal model and the exact
bounds are stated in Section 3. The proof of the first-round halting is given in Section 4, and for
second-round halting in Section 5.
2 Our Techniques
In this section, we outline our techniques for proving our results. We start with explaining our
bound for first-round halting of arbitrary protocols (Theorem 1.2). We then move to second-round
halting, starting with the weaker bound for arbitrary protocols (Theorem 1.3), and then move to
the much stronger bound for public-randomness protocols (Theorem 1.4).
Notations We use calligraphic letters to denote sets, uppercase for random variables, lowercase
for values, boldface for vectors, and sans-serif (e.g., A) for algorithms (i.e., Turing Machines). For
n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, · · · , n} and (n) = {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let dist(x, y) denote the hamming distance
between x and y. For a set S ⊆ [n] let S = [n] \ S. For a set R ⊆ {0, 1}n, let R|S = {xS ∈
{0, 1}|S| s.t. x ∈ R}, i.e., R|S is the projection of R on the index-set S.
Fix an n-party randomized BA protocol Π = (P1, . . . ,Pn). For presentation purposes, we assume
that validity and agreement hold perfectly, and consider no setup parameters (in the subsequent
sections, we remove these assumptions). Furthermore, we only address here the case where the
security threshold is t > n/3. The case t > n/4 requires an additional generic step that we defer to
the technical sections of the paper. We denote by Π(v; r) the output of an honest execution of Π
on input v ∈ {0, 1}n and randomness r (each party Pi holds input vi and randomness ri). We let
Π(v) denote the resulting random variable determined by the parties’ random coins, and we write
Π(v) = b to denote the event that the parties output b in an honest execution of Π on input v. All
corrupt parties described below are locally consistent (see Section 1.1).
2.1 First-Round Halting
Assume the honest parties of Π halt at the end of the first round with probability γ > 0 when facing
t corruptions (on every input). Our goal is to upperbound the value of γ. Our approach is inspired
by the analogous lower-bound for deterministic protocols (cf., [24, 21]). Namely, we start with a
configuration in which validity assures the common output is 0, and, while maintaining the same
output, we gradually adjust it into a configuration in which validity assures the common output
is 1, thus obtaining a contradiction. For randomized protocols, the challenge is to maintain the
invariant of the output, even when the probability of halting is far from 1. We make the following
observations:
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Almost pre-agreement: dist(v, bn) ≤ t =⇒ Π(v) = b. (1)
That is, in an honest execution of Π, if the parties almost start with preagreement, i.e., with at
least n − t of b’s in the input vector, then the parties output b with probability 1. Equation (1)
follows from agreement and validity by considering an adversary corrupting exactly those parties
with input vi 6= b, and otherwise not deviating from the protocol.
Neighboring executions (N1): dist(v0,v1) ≤ t =⇒ Pr
r
[Π(v0; r) = Π(v1; r)] ≥ γ. (2)
That is, for two input vectors that are at most t-far (i.e., the resiliency threshold), the probability
that the executions on these vectors yield the same output when using the same randomness is
bounded below by the halting probability. To see why Equation (2) holds, consider the following
adversary corrupting subset C, for C being the set of indices where v and v′ disagree. For an
arbitrary partition {C0, C1} of C, the adversary instructs C to send messages according to v0 to C0
and according to v1 to C1, respectively. With probability at least γ, all parties halt at the first
round, and, by perfect agreement, all parties compute the same output.7 Since parties in Cb cannot
distinguish this execution from a halting execution of Π(vb; r), Equation (2) follows.
We deduce that if there are more than n/3 corrupt parties, then the halting probability is 0;
this follows by combining the two observations above for v0 = 0
n−t1t and v1 = 0
t1n−t. Namely, by
Equation (1), it holds that Prr [Π(v0; r) = Π(v1; r)] = 0. Thus, by Equation (2), γ = 0.
2.2 Second-Round Halting – Arbitrary Protocols
We proceed to explain our bound for second-round halting of arbitrary protocols. Assume the
honest parties of Π halt at the end of the second round with probability γ > 0 when facing t
corruptions (on every input). Let t = (1/3 + ε) · n, for an arbitrary small constant ε > 0. In
spirit, the attack follows the footsteps of the single-round case described above; we show that
neighboring executions compute the same output with good enough probability (related to the
halting probability), and lower-bound the latter using the almost pre-agreement observation. There
is, however, a crucial difference between the first-round and second-round cases; the honest parties
can use the second round to detect whether (some) parties are sending inconsistent messages. Thus,
the second round of the protocol can be used to “catch-and-discard” parties that are pretending to
have different inputs to different parties, and so our previous attack breaks down. (In the one-round
case, we exploit the fact that the honest parties cannot verify the consistency of the messages they
received.) Still, we show that there is a suitable variant of the attack that violates the agreement
of any “too-good” scheme.
At a very high level, the idea for proving the neighboring property is to gradually increase the
set of honest parties towards which the adversary behaves according to v1 (for the remainder it
behaves according to v0, which is a decreasing set of parties). While the honest parties might
identify the attacking parties and discard their messages, they should still agree on the output and
halt at the conclusion of the second round with high probability. We exploit this fact to show
that at the two extremes (where the adversary is merely playing honestly according to v0 and v1,
7In the above, we have chosen to ignore a crucial subtlety. In an execution of the protocol, it may be the case that
there is a suitable message (according to v0 or v1) to prevent halting, yet the adversary cannot determine which one
to send. In further sections, we address this issue by taking a random partition of C (rather than an arbitrary one).
By doing so, we introduce an error-term of 1/2n−t when we upper bound the halting probability γ.
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respectively), the honest parties behave essentially the same. Therefore, if at one extreme (for v0)
the honest parties output b, it follows that they also output b at the other extreme (for v1), which
proves the neighboring property for the second-round case.
We implement the above by augmenting the one-round attack as follows. In addition to cor-
rupting a set of parties that feign different inputs to different parties, the adversary corrupts an
extra set of parties that is inconsistent with regards to the messages it received from the first set of
corrupted parties. To distinguish between the two sets of corrupted parties, the former (first) will
be referred to as “pivot” parties (since they pivot their input) and will be denoted P, and the latter
will be referred to as “propagating” parties (since they carefully choose what message to propagate
at the second round) and will be denoted L. We emphasize that the propagating parties deviate
from the protocol only at the second round and only with regards to the messages received by the
pivot parties (not with regards to their input – as is the case for the pivot parties). In more detail,
we partition P = [n] \ P into ℓ = ⌈1/ε⌉ sets {L1, . . . ,Lℓ}, and we show that, unless there exists i
such that parties in C = P ∪ Li violate agreement (explained below), the following must hold for
neighboring executions.
Neighbouring executions (N2): dist(v0,v1) ≤ n/3 =⇒ (3)
Pr [Π(v0) = b in two rounds] ≥ Pr [Π(v1) = b in two rounds]− 2(ℓ+ 1)2 · (1− γ).
That is, for two input vectors that are at most n/3–far, the difference in probability that two
distinct executions (for each input vector) yield the same output within two rounds is roughly
upper-bounded by the quantity (1 − γ)/ε2 (i.e., non-halting probability divided by ε2). To see
that Equation (3) holds true, fix v0,v1 ∈ {0, 1}n of hamming distance at most n/3, and let P
be the set of indices where v0 and v1 differ. Consider the following ℓ + 1 distinct variants of Π,
denoted {Π0, . . . ,Πℓ}; in protocol Πi, parties in P send messages to L1, . . . ,Li according to the
input prescribed by v1 and to Li+1, . . . ,Lℓ according to the input prescribed by v0, respectively.
All other parties follow the instructions of Π for input v0. We write Πi = b to denote the event that
the parties not in P output b. Notice that the endpoint executions Π0 and Πℓ are identical to honest
executions with input v0 and v1, respectively. Let Halti denote the event that the parties not in P
halt at the second round in an execution of Πi. We point out that Pr [¬Halti] ≤ (ℓ + 1) · (1 − γ),
since otherwise the adversary corrupting P and running Πi, for a random i ∈ (ℓ) ..= {0, . . . , ℓ},
prevents halting with probability greater than 1− γ. Next, we inductively show that
Pr [Πi = b ∧ Halti] ≥ Pr [Π0 = b ∧ Halt0]− 2i · (ℓ+ 1) · (1− γ), (4)
for every i ∈ (ℓ), which yields the desired expression for i = ℓ. In pursuit of contradiction, assume
Equation (4) does not hold, and let i denote the smallest index for which it does not hold (observe
that i 6= 0, by definition). Notice that
Pr [(Πi−1 = b ∧ Halti−1) ∧ (Πi 6= b ∧ Halti)]
≥ Pr [Πi−1 = b ∧ Halti−1]− Pr [Πi = b ∨ ¬Halti]
≥ Pr [Πi−1 = b ∧ Halti−1]− Pr [Πi = b ∧ Halti]− Pr [¬Halti]
> 2 · (ℓ+ 1) · (1− γ)− Pr [¬Halti]
≥ (ℓ+ 1) · (1− γ) > 0.
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The second inequality follows from union bound and A∨¬B ≡ (A∧B)∨¬B, the third inequality
is by induction hypothesis, and the last inequality by the bound Pr [¬Halti] ≤ (ℓ+ 1) · (1− γ).
It follows that an adversary corrupting C = P∪Li causes disagreement with non-zero probability
by acting as follows: parties in P and Li send messages according to Πi and Πi−1 to C0 and C1,
respectively, where {C0, C1} is an arbitrary partition of C = [n] \ P ∪ Li. Since disagreement
is ruled out by assumption, we deduce Equations (3) and (4). To conclude, we combine the
almost pre-agreement property (Equation (1)) with the neighboring property (Equation (3)) with
v0 = 0
n−t1t, v1 = 0
t1n−t, and b = 1. Namely, Pr [Π(v0) = 1 in two rounds] = 0, by almost pre-
agreement and Pr [Π(v1) = 1 in two rounds] ≥ γ, by almost pre-agreement and halting. It follows
that 0 ≥ γ−2(ℓ+1)2 · (1−γ), by Equation (3), and thus 1− 12(ℓ+1)2+1 ≥ γ, which yields the desired
expression.
2.3 Second-Round Halting – Public-Randomness Protocols
In Section 2.2, we ruled out “very good” second-round halting for arbitrary protocols via an efficient
locally consistent attack. Recall that if the halting probability is too good (probability almost one),
then there is a somewhat simple attack that violates agreement and/or validity. In this subsection,
we discuss ruling out any second-round halting, i.e., halting probability bounded away from zero,
for public-randomness protocols.
We first explain why the attack – as is – does not rule out second-round halting. Suppose that
at the first round the parties of Π send a deterministic function of their input, and at the second
round they send the messages they received at the first round together with a uniform random bit.
On input v and randomness r, the parties are instructed not to halt at the second round (i.e.,
carry on beyond the second round until they reach agreement with validity) if a super-majority
(≥ n − t) of the vi’s are in agreement and maj(r1, . . . , rn) 6= maj(v1, . . . , vn), i.e., the majority
of the random bits does not agree with the super-majority of the inputs. In all other cases, the
parties are instructed to output maj(r1, . . . , rn). It is not hard to see that this protocol will halt
with probability 1/2, even in the presence of the previous locally consistent adversary (regardless
of the choice of propagating parties Li). More generally, if the randomness uniquely determines
the output, the protocol designer can ensure that halting does not result in disagreement, by
partitioning the randomness appropriately, and thus foiling the previous attack.8
To overcome the above apparent obstacle, we introduce another dimension to our locally con-
sistent attack; we instruct an extra set of corrupted parties to abort at the second round without
sending their second-round messages. By utilizing aborting parties, the adversary can potentially
decouple the output/halting from the parties’ randomness and thus either prevent halting or cause
disagreement. In Section 2.3.1, we explain how to rule out second-round halting for a rather unre-
alistic class of public-randomness protocol. What makes the class of protocols unrealistic is that we
assume security holds against unbounded locally consistent adversaries, and the protocol prescribes
only a single bit of randomness per party per round. That being said, this case illustrates nicely
our attack, and it also makes an interesting connection to Boolean functions analysis (namely, the
KKL theorem [36]). For general public-randomness protocols, we only know how to analyze the
aforementioned attack assuming Conjecture 1.5, as explained in Section 2.3.2.
8In Section 2.2, halting was close to 1 and thus the randomness was necessarily ambiguous regarding the output.
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2.3.1 “Superb” Single-Coin Protocols
A BA protocol Π is t-superb if agreement and validity hold perfectly against an adaptive unbounded
locally consistent adversary corrupting at most t parties, i.e., the probability that such an adversary
violates agreement or validity is 0. A public-randomness protocol is single-coin, if, at any given
round, each party samples a single unbiased bit.
Theorem 2.1 (Second-round halting, superb single-coin protocols). For every ε > 0 there exists
c > 0 such that the following holds for large enough n. For t = (1/3 + ε) · n, let Π be a t-superb,
single-coin, n-party public-randomness Byzantine agreement protocol and let γ denote the probability
that the protocol halts in the second round under a locally consistent attack. Then, γ ≤ n−c.
We assume for simplicity that the parties do not sample any randomness at the first round,
and write r ∈ {0, 1}n for the vector of bits sampled by the parties at the second round, i.e., ri is a
uniform random bit sampled by Pi.
As discussed above, our attack uses an additional set of corrupted parties of size σ · n, dubbed
the “aborting” parties and denoted S, that abort indiscriminately at the second round (the value
of σ is set to ⌊ε/4⌋ and ℓ = 2 · ⌈1/ε⌉ to accommodate for the new set of corrupted parties, i.e.,
|Li| ≤ n · ε/2). In more detail, analogously to the previous analysis, we consider (ℓ + 1) ·
(
n
σn
)
distinct variants of Π, denoted {ΠSi }i,S and indexed by i ∈ (ℓ) and S ⊆ [n] of size σn, as follows. In
protocol ΠSi , parties in P send messages to L1, . . . ,Li according to the input prescribed by v1, and
to Li+1, . . . ,Lℓ according to the input prescribed by v0 (recall that P is exactly those indices where
v0 and v1 differ). Parties in S act according to P or Lj , for the relevant j, except that they abort
at the second round without sending their second-round messages. We write ΠSi (r) = b to denote
the event that the parties not in P ∪ S output b, where the parties’ second-round randomness is
equal to r. Let HaltSi denote the event that all parties not in P ∪S halt at the second round in an
execution of ΠSi , and define RSi (b) = {r ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. ΠSi (r) = b ∧ HaltSi }. The following holds:
Neighbouring executions (N2†): (5)
∀v0,v1 ∈ {0, 1}n with dist(v0,v1) ≤ n/3, ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [ℓ] ..= {1, . . . , ℓ} :(
∀S : Pr [ΠSi−1 = b ∧ HaltSi−1] ≥ γ/2) =⇒ (∀S : Pr [ΠSi = b ∧ HaltSi ] ≥ γ/2) .
In words, for both b ∈ {0, 1}: if ΠSi−1 = b and halts in two rounds with large probability (≥ γ/2),
for every S, then ΠSi = b and halts in two rounds with large probability, for every S. Before
proving Equation (5), we show how to use it to derive Theorem 2.1. We apply Equation (5) for
v0 = 0
n−t1t, v1 = 0
t1n−t, b = 0, and i = ℓ, in combination with the properties of validity and
almost pre-agreement (Equation (1)). Namely, by these properties, a random execution of Π on
input v0 where the parties in S abort at the second round yields output 0 with probability at least
γ/2, for every S ∈ ([n]σn). Therefore, by Equation (5), we deduce that a random execution of Π on
input v1 where the parties in S abort at the second round yields output 0 with probability at least
γ/2, for every S ∈ ([n]σn). The latter violates either validity or almost pre-agreement – contradiction.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 2.1, we prove Equation (5) by using the following corollary of
the seminal KKL theorem [36] from Bourgain et al. [11]. (Recall that R|S is the projection of R
on the index-set S.)
Lemma 2.2. For every σ, δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists c > 0 s.t. the following holds for large enough n.
Let R ⊆ {0, 1}n be s.t. |R|S | ≤ (1− δ) · 2(1−σ)n, for every S ⊆ [n] of size σn. Then, |R| ≤ n−c · 2n.
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Loosely speaking, Lemma 2.2 states that for a set R ⊆ {0, 1}n, if the size of every projection
on a constant fraction of indices is bounded away from one (in relative size), then the size of R is
vanishingly small (again, in relative size).9
Going back to the proof, in pursuit of contradiction, let i ≥ 1 denote the smallest index for
which Equation (5) does not hold, and without loss of generality suppose b = 0, i.e., there exists S
such that |RSi (0)| < γ/2 ·2n, and |RS
′
i−1(0)| ≥ γ/2 ·2n, for every relevant S ′. We prove Equation (5)
by proving Equations (6) and (7), which result in contradiction via Lemma 2.2.
Halting: |RSi (1)| ≥ γ/2 · 2n (6)
Perfect agreement: ∀S ′ : |RSi (1)|S ′ | ≤ (1− γ/2) · 2(1−σ)n (7)
Equation (6) follows by the halting property of ΠSi , since the execution halts if and only if r ∈
RSi (1) ∪ RSi (0), and, by assumption, |RSi (0)| < γ/2 · 2n. To conclude, we prove Equation (7) by
observing that for every S ′ and b ∈ {0, 1}, and every r and r′, if r ∈ RS′i−1(0) and r|S′ = r′|S′ , then
r′ ∈ RS′i−1(0) (by definition), i.e., membership to RS
′
i−1(0) does not depend on the indices of S ′. It
follows that |RSi−1(0)|S ′ | ≥ γ/2 · 2(1−σ)n , for every S ′, and therefore |RSi (1)|S ′ | ≤ (1− γ/2) · 2(1−σ)n ,
since the sets RSi (1)|S ′ and RSi−1(0)|S ′ are non-intersecting for every S ′. Otherwise, if RSi (1)|S ′ ∩
RSi−1(0)|S ′ 6= ∅, then the following attack violates the superb quality of the protocol. Fix S ′ and r
such that r ∈ RSi (1) and r|S′ ∈ RSi (1)|S ′ ∩RSi−1(0)|S ′ , and consider the attacker controlling P, Li,
S, and S ′ that sends messages according to ΠSi and ΠS
′
i−1 to C0 and C1, respectively, where {C0, C1}
is an arbitrary partition of C = [n] \ P ∪ Li ∪ S ∪ S ′. It is not hard to see the attacker violates
agreement, whenever the randomness lands on r.
Remark 2.3. For superb, single-coin, public-randomness protocol, repeated application of Equa-
tion (2) and Lemma 2.2 rules out second-round halting for arbitrary (constant) fraction of corrupted
parties (and not only n/3 fraction).
2.3.2 General (Public-Randomness) Protocols
The analysis above crucially relies on the superb properties of the protocol. While it can be
generalized for protocols with near-perfect statistical security and constant-bit randomness, we only
manage to analyze the most general case (i.e., protocols with non-perfect computational security and
arbitrary-size randomness) assuming Conjecture 1.5. Very roughly (and somewhat inaccurately),
when applying the above attack on general public-randomness protocols, the following happens for
some δ > 0 and both values of b ∈ {0, 1}: for (1 − δ)-fraction of possible aborting subsets S, the
probability that the honest parties halt in two rounds and output the same value b, whether parties
in S all abort or not, is bounded below by the halting probability. Assuming Conjecture 1.5, it
follows that with probability δ over the randomness and S, the honest parties under the attack
output opposite values depending whether the parties in S abort or not. We conclude that the
agreement of the protocol is at most δ. We refer the reader to Section 5.2 for the full details.
9In the jargon of Boolean functions analysis, since every large set has a o(n)-size index-set of influence almost one,
it follows that some projection on a constant fraction of indices is almost full.
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3 Our Lower Bounds
In this section, we formally state our lower bounds on the round complexity of Byzantine agreement
protocols. The communication and adversarial models as well as the notion of Byzantine agreement
protocols we consider are given in Section 3.1, and our bounds are formally stated in Section 3.2.
3.1 The Model
3.1.1 Protocols
All protocols considered in this paper are ppt (probabilistic polynomial time): the running time of
every party is polynomial in the (common) security parameter (given as a unary string). We only
consider boolean-input boolean-output protocols: apart from the common security parameter, all
parties have a single input bit, and each of the honest parties outputs a single bit. For an n-party
protocol Π, an input vector v ∈ {0, 1}n and randomness r, let Π(v; r) denote the output vector of
the parties in an (honest) execution with party Pi’s input being vi and randomness ri. For a set
of parties P ⊆ [n], we denote by Π(v; r)P the output vector of the parties in P.
The protocols we consider might have a setup phase in which before interaction starts a trusted
party distributes (correlated) values between the parties. We only require the security to hold for
a single use of the setup parameters (in reality, these parameters are set once and then used for
many interactions). This, however, only makes our lower bound stronger.
The communication model is synchronous, meaning that the protocols proceed in rounds. In
each round every party can send a message to every other party over a private and authenticated
channel. (Allowing the protocol to be executed over private channels makes our lower bounds
stronger.) It is guaranteed that all of the messages that are sent in a round will arrive at their
destinations by the end of that round.
3.1.2 Adversarial Model
We consider both adaptive and non-adaptive (also known as, static) adversaries. An adaptive adver-
sary can choose which parties to corrupt for the next round immediately after the conclusion of the
previous round but before seeing the next round’s messages. If a party has been corrupted then it
is considered corrupt for the rest of the execution. A non-adaptive (static) adversary chooses which
parties to corrupt before the execution of the protocol begins (i.e., before the setup phase, if such
exists). We measure the success probability of the latter adversaries as the expectation over their
choice of corrupted parties.
We consider both rushing and non-rushing adversaries. A non-rushing adversary chooses the
corrupted parties’ messages in a given round based on the messages sent in the previous rounds.
In contrast, a rushing adversary can base the corrupted parties’ messages on the messages sent in
the previous rounds, and on those sent by the honest parties in the current round.
Locally consistent adversaries. As discussed in Section 1.1, our attack requires very limited
capabilities from each corrupted party: to prematurely abort, and to lie about its input bit and
incoming messages from other corrupted parties. In particular, a corrupted party tosses its local
coins honestly and does not lie about incoming messages from honest parties. We now present the
formal definition.
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Definition 3.1 (locally consistent adversaries). Let Π = (P1, . . . ,Pn) be an n-party protocol and
let {αji,i′}i,i′∈[n],j∈N be its set of next-message functions, i.e.,
mji,i′ = α
j
i,i′
(
b; r; (m11,i, . . . ,m
1
n,i), . . . , (m
j−1
1,i , . . . ,m
j−1
n,i )
)
is the message party Pi sends to party Pi′ in the j’th round, given that its input bit is b, the random
coins it flipped till now are r, and in round j′ < j, it got the message mj
′
i′′,i from party Pi′′ . An
adversary taking the role of Pi is said to be locally consistent with respect to Π, if it flips its random
coins honestly, and the message it sends in the j’th round to party Pi′ takes one of the following
two forms:
Abort: the message ⊥.
Input and message selection: a set of messages {mℓ}kℓ=1, for some k, such that for each ℓ ∈ [k]:
mℓ = α
j
i,i′
(
bℓ; r; ((m
1
1)1, . . . , (m
1
n)1), . . . , ((m
j−1
1 )ℓ, . . . , (m
j−1
n )ℓ)
)
,
where bℓ ∈ {0, 1}, r are the coins Pi tossed (honestly) until now, and (mj
′
i′′)ℓ, for each j
′ < j
and i′′ 6= i, is one of the messages it received from party Pi′′ in the j’th round.
That is, a locally consistent party Pi might send party Pi′ a sequence of messages (and not just
one as instructed), each consistent with a possible choice of its input bit, and some of the messages
it received in the previous round. In turn, this will enable party Pi′ , if corrupted, the freedom to
choose in the next rounds the message of Pi it would like to act according to. Note that without
loss of generality, Pi will always sends a single message to the honest parties, as otherwise they will
discard the messages.
A few remarks are in place.
1. While the above definition does not enforce between-rounds consistency (a party might send
to another party a first-round message consistent with input 0 and a second-round message
consistent with input 1), compiling a given protocol so that every message party Pi sends to
Pi′ contains the previous messages Pi sent to Pi′ , will enforce such between-rounds consistency
on locally consistent parties.
2. Using standard cryptographic techniques, a protocol secure against locally consistent ad-
versaries can be compiled into one secure against arbitrary malicious adversaries, without
hurting the efficiency and round complexity of the protocol “too much.” If the protocol is
public randomness (see Definition 3.2) this reduction can be made extremely efficient, and in
particular preserve the round complexity (see Section 1.3).
3. The locally consistent parties considered in Sections 4 and 5 do not take full advantage of the
generality of Definition 3.1. Rather, the parties considered either act honestly but abort at
the conclusion of the first round, cheat in the first round and then abort, or cheat only in the
second round and then abort.
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3.1.3 Public-Randomness Protocols
In Section 1.1, we showed that the description of many natural protocols can be simplified when
security is required to hold only against locally consistent adversaries. In this relaxed description a
trusted setup phase and cryptographic assumptions are not required, and every party can publish
the coins it locally tossed in each round.
Definition 3.2 (Public-randomness protocols). A protocol has public randomness, if every party’s
message consists of two parts: the randomness it sampled in that round, and an arbitrary message
which is a function of its view (input, incoming messages, and coins tossed up to and including that
point). The party’s first message also contains its setup parameters, if such exist.
3.1.4 Byzantine Agreement
We now formally define the notion of Byzantine agreement. Since we focus on lower bounds we
will consider only the case of a single input bit and a single output bit. A more general notion of
Byzantine agreement will include string input and string outputs. A generic reduction shows that
the cost of agreeing on strings rather than bits is two additional rounds [59].
Definition 3.3 (Byzantine Agreement). We associate the following properties with a ppt n-party
Boolean input/output protocol Π.
Agreement. Protocol Π has (t, α)-agreement, if the following holds with respect to any ppt ad-
versary controlling at most t parties in Π and any value of the non-corrupted parties’ input
bits: in a random execution of Π on sufficiently large security parameter, all non-corrupted
parties output the same bit with probability at least 1− α.10
Validity. Protocol Π has (t, β)-validity, if the following holds with respect to any ppt adversary
controlling at most t parties in Π and an input bit b given as input to all non-corrupted parties:
in a random execution of Π on sufficiently large security parameter, all non-corrupted parties
output b with probability at least 1− β.
Halting. Protocol Π has (t, q, γ)-halting, if the following holds with respect to any ppt adversary
controlling at most t parties in Π and any value of the non-corrupted parties’ input bits: in a
random execution of Π on sufficiently large security parameter, all non-corrupted parties halt
within q rounds with probability at least γ.
Protocol Π is a (t, α, β, q, γ)-BA, if it has (t, α)-agreement, (t, β)-validity, and (t, q, γ)-halting. If the
protocol has a setup phase, then the above probabilities are taken with respect to this phase as well.
Remark 3.4 (Concrete security). Since we care about fixed values of a protocol’s characteristics
(i.e., agreement), the role of the security parameter in the above definition is to enable us to bound
the running time of the parties and adversaries in consideration in a meaningful way, and to
parametrize the cryptographic tools used by the parties (if there are any). Since the attacks we
present are efficient assuming the protocol is efficient (in any reasonable sense), the bounds we
present are applicable for a fixed protocol that might use a fixed cryptographic primitive, e.g., SHA-
256.
10A more general definition would allow the parameter α (and the parameters β, γ below) to depend on the
protocol’s security parameter. But in this paper we focus on the case that α is a fixed value.
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3.2 The Bounds
We proceed to present the formal statements of the three lower bounds.
First-round halting, arbitrary protocols. The first result bounds the halting probability
of arbitrary protocols after a single round. Namely, for “small” values of α and β, the halting
probability is “small” for t ≥ n/3 and “close to 1/2” for t ≥ n/4.
Theorem 3.5 (restating Theorem 1.2). Let Π be a ppt n-party protocol that is (t, α, β, 1, γ)-BA
against locally consistent, static, non-rushing adversaries. Then,
• t ≥ n/3 implies γ ≤ 5α+ 2β + err
• t ≥ n/4 implies γ ≤ 1/2 + 5α + β + err,
for err = 2t−n (err = 0 for public-randomness protocols whose security holds against rushing adver-
saries).
Second-round halting, arbitrary protocols. The second result bounds the halting probability
of arbitrary protocols after two rounds.
Theorem 3.6 (restating Theorem 1.3). Let Π be a ppt n-party protocol that is a (t, α, β, 2, γ)-BA
against locally consistent, static, non-rushing adversaries for t > n/4. Then γ ≤ 1+2α+ β
w2
− 1
2w2
for w = ⌈(n− ⌈n/4⌉)/ ⌊t− n/4⌋⌉+ 1.
In particular, for t = (1/4 + ε) · n and “small” α and β, the protocol might not halt at the
conclusion of the second round with probability ≈ 1/ε2.
Second-round halting, public-randomness protocols. The third result bounds the halting
probability of public-randomness protocols after two rounds. The result requires adaptive and
rushing adversaries, and is based on Conjecture 3.8 (stated in Section 3.3 below).
Theorem 3.7 (restating Theorem 1.4). Assume Conjecture 3.8 holds. Then, for any (constants)
εt, εγ > 0 there exists α > 0 such that the following holds for large enough n: let Π be a ppt
n-party, public-randomness protocol that is (t, α, β = ε2γ/200, 2, γ)-BA against locally consistent,
rushing, adaptive adversaries. Then,
• t ≥ (1/3 + εt) · n implies γ < εγ .
• t ≥ (1/4 + εt) · n implies γ < 12 + εγ .
In particular, assuming the protocol has perfect agreement and validity, the protocol never halts
in two rounds if the fraction of corrupted parties is greater than 1/3, and halts in two rounds with
probability at most 1/2 if the fraction of corrupted parties is greater than 1/4.
The value of α in the theorem is (roughly) δ · εt · ε2γ where δ is the constant guaranteed by
Conjecture 3.8. We were not trying to optimize over the constants in the above statement, and in
particular it seems that β can be pushed to ε2γ .
17
3.3 The Combinatorial Conjecture
Next, we provide the formal statement for the combinatorial conjecture used in Theorem 3.7. For
n ∈ N and σ ∈ [0, 1], let Dn,σ be the distribution induced on the subsets of [n] by sampling each
element independently with probability σ. For a finite alphabet Σ, a vector x ∈ Σn, and a subset
S ⊆ [n], define the vector ⊥S(x) ∈ Σn by
⊥S(x)i =
{
⊥, i ∈ S,
xi, otherwise.
Conjecture 3.8 (restating Conjecture 1.5). For any σ, λ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that the
following holds for large enough n ∈ N. Let Σ be a finite alphabet and let A0,A1 ⊆ {Σ ∪ ⊥}n be
two sets such that for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Σn
[r,⊥S(r) ∈ Ab] ≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ.
Then,
Pr
r←Σn
S←Dn,σ
[∀b ∈ {0, 1} : {r,⊥S(r)} ∩ Ab 6= ∅] ≥ δ.
4 Lower Bounds on First-Round Halting
In this section, we present our lower bound for the probability of first-round halting in Byzantine
agreement protocols.
Theorem 4.1 (Bound on first-round halting. Theorem 3.5 restated). Let Π be a ppt n-party
protocol that is (t, α, β, 1, γ)-BA against locally consistent, static, non-rushing adversaries. Then,
• t ≥ n/3 implies γ ≤ 5α+ 2β + err
• t ≥ n/4 implies γ ≤ 1/2 + 5α + β + err,
for err = 2t−n (err = 0 for public-randomness protocols whose security holds against rushing adver-
saries).
Let Π be as in Theorem 4.1. We assume for ease of notation that an honest party that runs
more than one round outputs ⊥ (it will be clear that the attack, described below, does not benefit
from this change). We also omit the security parameter from the parties’ input list, it will be clear
though that the adversaries we present are efficient with respect to the security parameter.
Lemma 4.2 (Neighboring executions). Let v,v′ ∈ {0, 1}n be with dist(v,v′) ≤ t. Then for both
b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
[
Π(v′) ∈ {b,⊥}n \ {⊥n}] ≥ Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n]− (1− γ)− 4α− err.
Namely, the lemma bounds from below the probability that in a random honest execution of
the protocol on input v′, at least one party halts in the first round while outputting b.
We prove Lemma 4.2 below, but first use it to prove Theorem 4.1. We also make use of the
following immediate observation.
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Claim 4.3 (Almost pre-agreement). Let v ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1} be such that dist(v, bn) ≤ t.
Then, Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n] ≥ 1− α− β.
Proof. Let A ⊂ [n] be a subset of size n − t such that vA = b|A|. The claimed validity of Π yields
that
Pr
[
Π(v)A /∈ {b,⊥}|A|
]
< β
This follows from β-validity of Π and the fact that an honest party cannot distinguish between an
execution of Π(v) and an execution of Π(bn) in which all parties not in A act as if their input bit
is as in v. Hence, by the claimed agreement of Π,
Pr [Π(v) /∈ {b,⊥}n] < α+ β

Proof of Theorem 4.1. We separately prove the theorem for t ≥ n/3 and for t ≥ n/4.
The case t ≥ n/3. We assume for simplicity that (n − t)/2 ∈ N, let v0 = 0t1⌈(n−t)/2⌉0⌊(n−t)/2⌋
and let v1 = 1
t1⌈(n−t)/2⌉0⌊(n−t)/2⌋. Note that dist(v0,v1) = t, and that for both b ∈ {0, 1} it holds
that dist(vb, b
n) ≤ t. Hence, by Claim 4.3, for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr [Π(vb) ∈ {b,⊥}n] ≥ 1− α− β.
Applying Lemma 4.2 to v = v0 and v
′ = v1 yields that
Pr [Π(v1) ∈ {0,⊥}n \ {⊥n}] ≥ 1− 5α− β − (1− γ)− err,
yielding that 5α+ 2β + (1− γ) + err ≥ 1.
The case t ≥ n/4. In this case there are no two vectors that are t apart in Hamming distance,
and still each of them has n − t entries of opposite values. Rather, we consider the two vectors
v0 = 0
t0t0t1n−3t and v1 = 1
t1t0t1n−3t of distance 2t. For both b ∈ {0, 1}, the vector vb has at least
n− t entries with b and is of distance t from the vector v⋆ = 1t0t0t1n−3t.
As in the first part of the proof, Applying Claim 4.3 and Lemma 4.2 on vb and v
⋆, for both
b ∈ {0, 1}, yields that
Pr [Π(v⋆) ∈ {b,⊥}n \ {⊥n}] ≥ 1− 5α− β − (1− γ)− err,
yielding that 2(5α + β + (1− γ) + err) ≥ 1. 
4.1 Proving Lemma 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Fix b ∈ {0, 1} and let δ = Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n]. Let P be the coordinates in
which v and v′ differ, and let P = n \ P. Let I be the index (a function of the parties’ coins
and setup parameters) of the smallest party in P that halts in the first round and outputs the
same value, both if the parties in P send their messages according to input v and if they do that
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according to v′. We let I = 0 if there is no such party, and (abusing notation) sometimes identify
I with the event that I 6= 0, e.g., Pr [I] stands for Pr [I 6= 0]. Clearly,
δ ≤ Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n ∧ I] + (1− Pr [I])
and thus
Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n ∧ I] ≥ δ − (1− Pr [I]) (8)
It follows that
Pr
[
Π(v′) ∈ {b,⊥}n \ {⊥n}] ≥ Pr [Π(v′) ∈ {b,⊥}n ∧ I] (9)
= Pr
[
Π(v′) ∈ {b,⊥}n ∧ Π(v′)I = b
]
≥ Pr [Π(v′)I = b]− α
= Pr [Π(v)I = b]− α
≥ Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n ∧ Π(v)I = b]− 2α
= Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n ∧ I]− 2α
≥ δ − (1− Pr [I])− 2α.
The first inequality and the equalities hold by the definition of I. The second and third inequalities
hold by agreement, and the last inequality holds by Equation (8). We conclude the proof showing
that:
Pr [I] ≥ γ − err − 2α (10)
Let Eh be the event that each party in P either does not halt when the parties in P act according
to v or does not halt when they act according to v′. Let Ea be the event that Eh does not occur,
but I = 0. Clearly I = 0⇐⇒ Eh ∨ Ea.
Consider the adversary that in the first round acts toward a random subset of P according to
input v and towards the remaining parties according to v′, and aborts at the end of this round.
It is clear that if Ea occurs, the above adversary violates agreement with probability 1/2. Thus,
Pr [Ea] ≤ 2α.
It is also clear that when Eh occurs, the above attacker fails to prevent an honest party in P
from halting in the first round only if the following event happens: each party in P does not halt
in Π(v′′) for some v′′ ∈ {v,v′}, but the adversary acts towards each of these parties on the input
in which it does halt. The latter event happens with probability at most 2−|P| ≤ 2t−n = err. Thus,
Pr [Eh] ≤ 1− (γ − err). We conclude that
Pr [I] ≥ 1− Pr [Eh]− Pr [Ea] ≥ γ − err − 2α (11)
Finally, we note that if the protocol has public randomness, the (now rushing) attacker does not
have to guess what input to act upon. Rather, after seeing the first-round randomness, it finds an
input v′′ ∈ {v,v′} such that at least one party in P does not halt in Π(v′′) or violates agreement,
and acts according to this input. Hence, the bound on I changes to
Pr [I] ≥ γ − α,
proving the theorem statement for such protocols. 
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5 Lower Bounds on Second-Round Halting
In this section, we prove lower bounds for second-round halting of Byzantine agreement protocols.
In Section 5.1, we prove a bound for arbitrary protocols, and in Section 5.2, we give a much
stronger bound for public-randomness protocols (the natural extension of public-coin protocols to
the ’with-input’ setting).
5.1 Arbitrary Protocols
We start by proving our lower bound for second-round halting of arbitrary protocols.
Theorem 5.1 (Bound on second-round halting, arbitrary protocols. Theorem 3.6 restated). Let
Π be a ppt n-party protocol that is a (t, α, β, 2, γ)-BA against locally consistent, static, non-rushing
adversaries for t > n/4. Then γ ≤ 1 + 2α+ βw2 − 12w2 for w = ⌈(n− ⌈n/4⌉)/ ⌊t− n/4⌋⌉+ 1.
Let Π be as in Theorem 5.1. We assume for ease of notation that an honest party that runs
more than two rounds outputs ⊥ (it will be clear that the attack, described below, does not benefit
from this change). We also assume without loss of generality that the honest parties in an execution
of Π never halt in one round (by adding a dummy round if needed). Finally, we omit the security
parameter from the parties’ input list, it will be clear though that the adversaries we present are
efficient with respect to the security parameter.
Let k = ⌈n/4⌉ and let h = ⌈(n− k)/(t− k)⌉. The theorem is easily implied by the next lemma.
Lemma 5.2 (Neighboring executions). Let v,v′ ∈ {0, 1}n be with dist(v,v′) ≤ k. Then, for every
b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
[
Π(v′) = bn
] ≥ Pr [Π(v) = bn]− h(h+ 1)(2α + 1− γ)− α.
Namely, the lemma bounds from below the probability that in a random honest execution of
the protocol on input v′ all parties halt within two rounds while outputting b.
We prove Lemma 5.2 below, but first use it to prove Theorem 5.1. We also make use of the
following immediate observation.
Claim 5.3 (Almost pre-agreement). Let v ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1} be such that dist(v, bn) ≤ t.
Then, Pr [Π(v) = bn] ≥ 1− α− β − (1− γ).
Proof. The same argument as in the proof of Claim 4.3 yields that
Pr [Π(v) /∈ {b,⊥}n] < α+ β
Thus, by γ-second-round halting
Pr [Π(v) 6= bn] < α+ β + (1− γ)

Proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider the vectors v0 = 0
k0k0k1n−3k, v1 = 1
k1k0k1n−3k and v⋆ =
1k0k0k1n−3k. Note that for both b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that dist(vb, bn) ≤ t since n/4 ≤ k ≤ t),
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and that dist(vb,v
⋆) = k. Applying Lemma 5.2 and Claim 5.3 for each of these vectors, yields that
for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr [Π(v⋆) = bn] ≥ 1− α− β − (1− γ)− h(h + 1)(2α + 1− γ)− α
≥ 1− β − (h+ 1)2(2α + 1− γ).
Note that w = h + 1, which implies β + w2(2α + 1 − γ) ≥ 1/2, and the proof follows by a simple
calculation. 
5.1.1 Proving Lemma 5.2
We assume for ease of notation that dist(v,v′) = k (rather than ≤ k) and let ℓ = t − k. Assume
for ease of notation that h · ℓ = n− k (i.e., no rounding), and for a k-size subset of parties P ⊂ [n],
let LP1 , . . . ,LPh be an arbitrary partition of P = [n] \ P into ℓ-size subsets. Consider the following
family of protocols:
Protocol 5.4 (ΠPd ).
Parameters: A subset P ⊆ [n] and an index d ∈ (h).
Input: Every party Pi has an input bit vi ∈ {0, 1}.
First round:
Party Pi ∈ P. If d = 0 [resp., d = h], act honestly according to Π with respect to input bit vi
[resp., 1− vi]. Otherwise,
1. Choose random coins honestly (i.e., uniformly at random).
2. To each party in
⋃
j∈{1,...,d}LPj : send a message according to input 1− vi.
3. To each party in
⋃
j∈{d+1,...,h}LPj : send a message according to input vi (real input).
4. Send no messages to the other parties in P.
Other parties. Act according to Π.
Second round:
Party Pi ∈ P. If d = 0 [resp., d = h], act honestly according to Π with respect to input bit vi
[resp., 1− vi]; otherwise, abort.
Other parties. Act honestly according to Π.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Namely, the “pivot” parties in P gradually shift their inputs from their real input to its negation
according to parameter d. Note that protocol ΠP0 (v) is equivalent to an honest execution of protocol
Π(v), and ΠPh (v) is equivalent to an honest execution of Π(v
′), for v′ being v with the coordinates
in P negated. Lemma 5.2 easily follows by the next claim about Protocol 5.4. In the following we
let δ = Pr
[
Π(v)P = b
|P|].
Claim 5.5. For any k-size subset P ⊂ [n] and d ∈ (h) it holds that
Pr
[
ΠPd (v)P = b
|P|] ≥ δ − d(h + 1)(2α + 1− γ)
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We prove Claim 5.5 below, but first use it to prove Lemma 5.2.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. By Claim 5.5,
Pr
[
ΠPh (v)P = b
|P|] ≥ δ − h(h+ 1)(2α + 1− γ)
Since ΠPh (v) is just an honest execution of Π(v
′), by agreement
Pr
[
Π(v′) = bn
] ≥ δ − h(h + 1)(2α + 1− γ)− α

Proof of Claim 5.5. The proof is by induction on d. The base case d = 0 holds by definition.
Suppose for contradiction the claim does not hold, and let d∗ ∈ (h−1) be such that the claim holds
for d∗ but not for d∗+1. Let γd be the probability that all honest parties halt in the second round
of a random execution of ΠPd (v). The assumption about d
∗ yields that
Pr
[
ΠPd∗(v)P = b
|P|] ≥ δ − β − d∗(h+ 1)(2α + 1− γ) (12)
and
Pr
[
ΠPd∗+1(v)P ∈ {0, 1}|P| \ {b|P|}
]
> 1− (δ − β − (d∗ + 1)(h + 1)(2α + 1− γ))− (1− γd) (13)
We note that for every d ∈ (h)
1− γd
h+ 1
≤ 1− γ (14)
Indeed, otherwise, the adversary that corrupts the parties in P and acts like ΠPd for a random
d ∈ (h), violates the γ-second-round-halting property of Π. We conclude that
Pr
r
[
ΠPd∗(v; r)P = b
|P| ∧ ΠPd∗+1(v; r)P ∈ {0, 1}|P| \ {b|P|}
]
(15)
≥ 1−
(
1− Pr
r
[
ΠPd∗(v; r)P = b
|P|])− (1− Pr
r
[
ΠPd∗+1(v; r)P ∈ ({0, 1}|P| \ {b|P|}
])
> (h+ 1)(2α + 1− γ)− (1− γd)
≥ (h+ 1)2α,
for r being the randomness of the parties. The first inequality is by Equations (12) and (13), and
the second one by Equation (14).
Consider the adversary that samples d ← (h), corrupts the parties in P ∪ LPd+1, and acts
towards a uniform random subset of the honest parties according to ΠPd and to the remaining
parties according to ΠPd+1. Equation (15) yields that the above adversary causes disagreement with
probability larger than (h+1)2α/2(h+1) = α. Since it corrupts at most t parties, this contradicts
the assumption about Π. 
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5.2 Public-Randomness Protocols
We proceed to prove our lower bound for second-round halting of public-randomness protocols.
Theorem 5.6 (Lower bound on second-round halting, public-randomness protocols. Theorem 3.7
restated). Assume Conjecture 3.8 holds. Then, for any (constants) εt, εγ > 0 there exists α > 0
such that the following holds for large enough n: let Π be a ppt n-party, public-randomness protocol
that is (t, α, β = ε2γ/200, 2, γ)-BA against locally consistent, rushing, adaptive adversaries. Then,
• t ≥ (1/3 + εt) · n implies γ < εγ .
• t ≥ (1/4 + εt) · n implies γ < 12 + εγ .
Assume Conjecture 3.8 holds. Let Π be as in the theorem statement, and assume γ = εγ in
the case t ≥ (1/3 + εt) · n and γ = 12 + εγ in the case t ≥ (1/4 + εt) · n. Let λ = εγ/10 and
σ = εt/4. Recall that ⊥S(x) is the string resulting by replacing all entries of x indexed by S with
⊥. Conjecture 3.8 yields that there exists δ > 0 such that the following holds for large enough n:
let Σ be a finite alphabet and let A0,A1 ⊂ {Σ ∪ ⊥}n be two sets such that for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Σn
[r,⊥S(r) ∈ Ab] ≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ.
Then,
Pr
r←Σn,S←Dn,σ
[∀b ∈ {0, 1} : {r,⊥S(r)} ∩ Ab 6= ∅] ≥ δ. (16)
In the following we assume α = min {δλεt/10, β} and derive a contradiction, yielding that the
agreement error has to be larger than that.
Fix n that is large enough for Equation (16) to hold and that PrS←Dn,σ [|S| > 2σn] = 2−Θ(n·σ
2) ≤
α, i.e., n > Θ((log 1/α)/σ2). As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we assume for ease of notation that
an honest party that runs more than two round outputs ⊥, and that the honest parties in Π never
halt in one round. We also omit the security parameter from the parties input list. We assume
without loss of generality that in the first round, the parties flip no coin, since such coins can be
added to the setup parameter.
We use the following notation: the setup parameter and second-round randomness of the parties
in Π are identified with elements of F and R, respectively. We denote by fi and ri the setup
parameter and the second-round randomness of party Pi in Π, and letDF be the joint distribution of
the parties’ setup parameters (by definition, the joint distribution of the second-round randomness is
the product distributionRn). For v ∈ {0, 1}n, f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ Supp(DF ), and r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈
Rn, let Π(v; (f , r)) denote the execution of Π in which party Pi gets input vi, setup parameter fi
and second-round randomness ri. We naturally apply this notation for the variants of Π considered
in the proof.
For S ⊆ [n], let ΠS be the variant of Π in which the parties in S halt at the end of the first
round. Let k = ⌈t− εt · n⌉ (i.e., k = ⌈n/3⌉ if t ≥ (1/3 + εt) · n, and k = ⌈n/4⌉ if t ≥ (1/4 + εt) · n).
The heart of the proof lies in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.7 (Neighboring executions). Let v,v′ ∈ {0, 1}n be with dist(v,v′) ≤ k, let b ∈ {0, 1},
and let S = [n] \ S. Then, with probability at least γ − 7λ − α+Pr[Π(v)6=bn]λ over f ← DF , it holds
that
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
Π(v′; (f , r)) = bn ∧ ΠS(v′; (f , r))S = b|S|
]
≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ.
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Namely, in an execution of Π(v′), all honest parties halt after two rounds and output b, regard-
less of whether a random subset of parties aborts after the first round. Lemma 5.7 is proven in
Section 5.2.1, but let us first use it to prove Theorem 3.7. We make use of the following immediate
observation:
Claim 5.8 (Almost pre-agreement). Let v ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1} be such that dist(v, bn) ≤ t.
Then, Pr [Π(v) ∈ {b,⊥}n] ≥ 1− α− β.
Proof. The proof of this claim uses an identical argument as in the proof of Claim 4.3. 
Proving Theorem 3.7.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We separately prove the case t ≥ (1/3 + εt) · n and t ≥ (1/4 + εt) · n.
The case t ≥ (1/3 + εt) · n. Let v0 = 0k1⌈(n−k)/2⌉0⌊(n−k)/2⌋ and let v1 = 1k1⌈(n−k)/2⌉0⌊(n−k)/2⌋.
Note that dist(v0,v1) = k and that for both b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that dist(vb, bn) ≤ t. We will use
Lemma 5.7 and Claim 5.8 to prove that Π(v1) = 0
n with noticeable probability, contradicting the
validity of the protocol.
Recall that, in this case, γ = εγ , that λ = εγ/10 and α, β ≤ ε2γ/200 = λ2/2. Claim 5.8 yields
that for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
[
Π(vb) 6= bn
]
≥ Pr [Π(vb) ∈ {b,⊥}n] ≥ 1− α− β ≥ 1− λ2 (17)
Applying Lemma 5.7 with respect to v0 and v1 and b = 0, yields that with probability at least
γ − 7λ− α+ Pr [Π(v0) 6= 0
n]
λ
≥ 3λ− λ = 2λ
over f ← DF , it holds that
Pr
r
[Π(v1; (f , r)) = 0
n] ≥ λ
and therefore
Pr [Π(v1) = 0
n] ≥ 2λ2
in contradiction to Equation (17).
The case t ≥ (1/4 + εt) · n. Consider the vectors v0 = 0k0k0k1n−3k, v1 = 1k1k0k1n−3k and v⋆ =
1k0k0k1n−3k. Note that for both b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that dist(vb, bn) ≤ t and that dist(vb,v⋆) = k.
Applying Lemma 5.7 and Claim 5.8 on vb and v
⋆, for both b ∈ {0, 1}, yields that ΠS(v⋆) = bn with
noticeable probability over the choice of S. This will allow us to use Conjecture 3.8 to lowerbound
the protocol’s agreement.
Recall that, in this case, γ = 1/2 + εγ . (Hence, λ = 20γ.) A similar calculation to the one in
the previous case yields that by Lemma 5.7 and Claim 5.8, for both b ∈ {0, 1}: with probability at
least 12 + 2λ over f ← DF it holds that
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
Π(v⋆; (f , r)) = bn ∧ ΠS(v⋆; (f , r))S = b|S|
]
≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ.
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It follows that there exists a set T ⊆ Supp(DF ) with Prf←DF [T ] ≥ 4λ, such that for every f ∈ T ,
for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
Π(v⋆; (f , r)) = bn ∧ ΠS(v⋆; (f , r))S = b|S|
]
≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ (18)
We assume without loss of generality that if a party gets ⊥ as its second-round random coins,
it aborts after the first round. For r ∈ (R∪ {⊥})n let E(r) be the indices in r of the value ⊥. For
f ∈ Supp(DF ) and b ∈ {0, 1}, let
Afb =
{
r ∈ {R ∪ ⊥} : Π(v⋆; (f , r))E(r) = b|E(r)|
}
(19)
By Equation (18), for f ∈ T and b ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
r,⊥S(r) ∈ Afb
]
≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ (20)
Hence by Conjecture 3.8, see Equation (16), for f ∈ T it holds that
Pr
r←Rn,S←Dn,σ
[∀b ∈ {0, 1} : {r,⊥S(r)} ∩ Ab 6= ∅] > δ.
That is,
Pr
r←Rn,S←Dn,σ
[
∀b ∈ {0, 1} ∃Sb ∈ {S, ∅} : ΠSb(v⋆; (f , r))Sb = b|
Sb|] > δ (21)
Consider the following adversary:
Algorithm 5.9 (A).
Pre-interaction. Corrupt a random subset S ← Dn,σ conditioned on |S| ≤ 2σn.
First round. Act according to Π.
Second round. Sample S0,S1 at random from {∅,S}, and act towards some honest parties ac-
cording to ΠS0 and towards the others according to ΠS1 .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recall that n is chosen so that PrS←Dn,σ [|S| > 2σn] ≤ α and that α < δ/2. By Equation (21),
the above adversary violates the agreement of Π on input v⋆ with probability larger than δ −
PrS←Dn,σ [|S| > 2σn] ≥ δ − α > α, in contradiction with the assumed agreement of Π. 
5.2.1 Proving Lemma 5.7
Fix v,v ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1} as in the lemma statement. We assume for simplicity that
dist(v,v′) = k (rather than ≤ k). Let ℓ = ⌊(t− k)/2⌋ and let h = ⌈(n − k)/ℓ⌉. Assume for ease
of notation that h · ℓ = n − k (i.e., no rounding), and for a k-size subset of parties P ⊂ [n], let
LP1 , . . . ,LPh be an arbitrary partition of P = [n] \ P into ℓ-size subsets. Consider the following
protocol family.
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Protocol 5.10 (ΠP,Sd ).
Parameters: subsets P,S ⊆ [n] and an index d ∈ (h).
Input: Party Pi has a setup parameter fi and an input bit vi.
First round:
Party Pi ∈ P. If d = 0 [resp., d = h], act honestly according to Π with respect to input bit
vi [resp., 1− vi]. Otherwise,
1. Choose random coins honestly (i.e., uniformly at random).
2. To each party in
⋃
j∈{1,...,d}LPj : send a message according to input 1− vi.
3. To each party in
⋃
j∈{d+1,...,h}LPj : send a message according to input vi (real input).
4. Send no messages to the other parties in P.
Other parties. Act according to Π.
Second round:
Parties in P \ S. If d = 0 [resp., d = h], act honestly according to Π with respect to input
bit vi [resp., 1− vi]; otherwise, abort.
Parties in S. Abort.
Other parties. Act according to Π.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Namely, the “pivot” parties in P shift their inputs from their real input to the flipped one
according to parameter d. The “aborting” parties in S abort at the end of the first round. Note
that protocol ΠP,S0 is the same as protocol Π
S , and ΠP,Sh (v) acts like Π
S(v′), for v′ being v with
the coordinates in P flipped.
For P,S ⊆ [n], let P ∪ S = [n] \ (P ∪ S), let d ∈ (h), let c ∈ {0, 1}, and let
VPd,c =
{
(f ,S, r) : ΠP,Sd (v; (f , r))P∪S = c|P∪S|
}
Namely, VPd,c are the sets, setup parameters and random strings on which honest parties in ΠP,Sd
halt in the second round and output c. Let χ = Pr [Π(v) 6= bn] and let
T Pd,c =
{
f : Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
(f ,S, r), (f , ∅, r) ∈ VPd,c
] ≥ λ] ≥ 1− δ}
The proof of Lemma 5.7 immediately follows by the next lemma.
Lemma 5.11. For every k-size subset P ⊂ [n] and d ∈ [h], it holds that
Pr
DF
[T Pd,b] ≥ γ − 7λ− χ+ αλ
Proof of Lemma 5.7. Immediate by Lemma 5.11. 
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The rest of this subsection is devoted for proving Lemma 5.11. Fix a k-size subset P ⊂ [n] and
omit it from the notation when clear from the context. Let
V˜d,c =
{
(f ,S, r) : ∀a ∈ {0, 1} ΠP,Sd+a(v; (f , r))P∪S = c|P∪S|
}
Namely, V˜d,c ⊆ Vd,c are the sets, setup parameters and random strings, on which honest parties in
ΠP,Sd+a halt in the second round and output c, regardless whether the parties in S abort and whether
the parties in P act toward those in Ld+1 according to input 0 or 1. Let
T˜d,c =
{
f : Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
(f ,S, r), (f , ∅, r) ∈ V˜d,c
]
≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ
}
,
let T˜d = T˜d,0 ∪ T˜d,1, and let T˜ =
⋂
i∈(h−1) T˜d. Lemma 5.11 is proved via the following claims (the
following probabilities are taken over f ← DF ).
Claim 5.12. Pr
[
Td+1,b | T˜
]
< η implies Pr
[
Td,b | T˜
]
≥ 1− η.
Proof of Claim 5.12. By definition, Pr
[
T˜d+1 | T˜
]
= 1. Hence, Pr
[
T˜d+1,b | T˜
]
< η implies
Pr
[
T˜d+1,b | T˜
]
> 1− η, and the latter implies that Pr
[
Td,b | T˜
]
> 1− η. 
Claim 5.13. Pr
[
T˜
]
≥ γ − 6λ.
Claim 5.14. Pr
[
T1,b | T˜
]
≥ 1− (χ+ α)/(Pr[T˜ ] · λ).
Claim 5.15. For every d ∈ [h− 1].
Pr
[
Td,0 | T˜
]
+ Pr
[
Td,1 | T˜
]
≤ 1 + λ
h · Pr[T˜ ]
We prove Claims 5.13 to 5.15 below, but first use the above claims for proving Lemma 5.7.
Proving Lemma 5.11.
Proof of Lemma 5.11. We first prove that for every d ∈ [h]:
Pr
[
Td,b | T˜
]
≥ 1− χ+ α
Pr[T˜ ] · λ −
dλ
h · Pr[T˜ ] (22)
The proof is by induction on d. The base case, d = 1, is by Claim 5.14. The induction steps follows
by the combination of Claims 5.12 and 5.15. Applying Equation (22) for d = h, yields that
Pr [Th,b] ≥ Pr[T˜ ]− χ+ α
λ
− λ,
and the proof follows by Claim 5.13. 
So it is left to prove Claims 5.13 to 5.15. Note that the following adversaries corrupt at most
k + ℓ + 2σn ≤ t and thus they make a valid attack. Since our security model consider rushing
adversaries, and Π has pubic randomness, we assume the adversary knows f = (f1, . . . , fn) before
sending its first-round messages. In the following we let ΠSd = Π
P,S
d and Πd = Π
∅
d.
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Proving Claim 5.13. This is the only part in proof where we exploit the fact that the protocol
is secure against adaptive adversaries.
Proof of Claim 5.13. Consider the following rushing adaptive adversary.
Algorithm 5.16 (A).
Pre interaction: Corrupt the parties in P.
First round. Let f be the parties’ setup parameters.
Do 1/λδ times:
1. Sample S ← Dn,σ conditioned on |S| ≤ 2σn.
2. For each i ∈ (h − 1): estimate ξi = Prr←Rn
[
(f ,S, r), (f , ∅, r) ∈ V˜i
]
by taking
Θ(log(h/λ)) samples of r.
3. Let d = argmini∈(h−1) {ξi}.
4. If ξd < 2λ, break the loop.
Corrupt the parties in S ∪ Ld+1 (S is the set sampled in the last loop), and act according to
Πd.
Second round.
Let r be the parties’ second-round randomness.
If (f , ∅, r) /∈ Vd+a for some a ∈ {0, 1},
act according to Πd+a.
Else,
Let a ∈ {0, 1} be such that (f ,S, r) /∈ Vd+a, set to 0 if no such value exists.
Act according to ΠSd+a.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Let D be the value of d chosen by the adversary A (at the first round of the protocol). Since
PrS←Dn,σ [|S| > 2σn] ≤ α < δ/2, if f /∈ T˜ then except with probability λ it holds that ξD ≤ 2λ.
Where if ξD ≤ 2λ, then in the interaction with A the honest parties both halt in the second round
and output the same value with probability at most 5λ. Where since α < λ, the honest parties
halt in the second round of such interaction with probability smaller than 6λ. We conclude that
the honest parties halt in the second round under the above attack with probability smaller than
Pr[T˜ ] + Pr[¬T˜ ] · 6λ ≤ Pr[T˜ ] + 6λ, yielding that Pr[T˜ ] > γ − 6λ. 
Proving Claim 5.14.
Proof of Claim 5.14. By definition, for f ∈ T1,b it holds that
Pr
r←Rn
[
Π1(v; (f , r))H = b
|H|
]
= Pr
r←Rn
[
(f , ∅, r) ∈ V1,b
]
≥ λ,
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letting H = P ∪L1 and H = [n] \H. Let η = Prf
[
T1,b | T˜
]
, clearly, Prf
[
T1,b | T˜
]
= 1− η. By the
above
Pr
[
Π1(v)H = b
|H|
]
≥ Pr[T˜ ] · η · λ (23)
(recall that Π1(v) stands for Π1(v; (f , r)), for a random choice of (f , r))). Finally, we notice that
Pr
[
Π1(v) = b
|H|
]
+ Pr [Π(v) = bn] ≤ 1 + α (24)
Otherwise, the adversary corrupting the parties in H, and acting toward the first honest parties
according to Π and toward the rest according to Π1 violates the α-agreement of Π. We conclude
that Pr[T˜ ] · η · λ ≤ χ+ α, and therefore η ≤ (χ+ α)/(Pr[T˜ ] · λ). 
Proving Claim 5.15. The proof uses Conjecture 3.8 in a similar way to the second part of the
proof of the theorem.
Proof of Claim 5.15. For r ∈ (R ∪ {⊥})n let E(r) be the indices in r of the value ⊥. We assume
without loss of generality that a party aborts upon getting ⊥ as its second round random coins.
For f ∈ Supp(DF ), for d ∈ [h− 1], and for b ∈ {0, 1}, let
Afb =
{
r ∈ {R ∪ ⊥} : Πd(v; (f , r))P∪Ld∪E(r) = b|
P∪Ld∪E(r)|} (25)
By definition, for f ∈ Td,0 ∩ Td,1 and b ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Rn
[
r,⊥S(r) ∈ Afb
]
≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ (26)
By Conjecture 3.8, see Equation (16), for f ∈ Td,0 ∩ Td,1 it holds that
Pr
r←Rn,S←Dn,σ
[
∀b ∈ {0, 1} : {r,⊥S(r)} ∩ Afb 6= ∅
]
> δ
That is,
Pr
r←Rn,S←Dn,σ
[
∀b ∈ {0, 1} ∃Sb ∈ {S, ∅} : ΠSbd (v; (f , r))P∪Ld∪Sb = b|
P∪Ld∪Sb|] > δ (27)
In pursuit of contradiction, assume that Pr
[
Td,0 | T˜
]
+ Pr
[
Td,1 | T˜
]
≥ 1 + λ/(h · Pr[T˜ ]) for some
d ∈ [h− 1]. It follows that
Pr
f←DF
r←Rn,S←Dn,σ
[
∀b ∈ {0, 1} ∃Sb ∈ {S, ∅} : ΠSbd (v; (f , r))P∪Ld∪Sb = b|
P∪Ld∪Sb|] (28)
> Pr [Td,0 ∩ Td,1] · δ
≥ Pr[T˜ ] · Pr[Td,0 ∩ Td,1 | T˜ ] · δ
≥ Pr[T˜ ] · λ
h · Pr[T˜ ] · δ
= λδ/h
> 8α.
30
The first inequality is by Equation (27), the second one by the assumption that Pr[Td,0 | T˜ ]+Pr[Td,1 |
T˜ ] ≥ 1 + λ/(h · Pr[T˜ ]), and the last one by the definition of α.
Consider the following rushing adversary:
Algorithm 5.17 (A).
Pre-interaction.
1. For each i ∈ [h− 1], estimate
ξi = Pr
r←Rn,S←Dn,σ
[
∀b ∈ {0, 1} ∃Sb ∈ {S, ∅} : ΠSbd (v; (f , r))P∪Ld∪Sb = b|
P∪Ld∪Sb|]
by taking Θ(log(h/α)/α samples. Let d = argmaxi∈[h−1] {ξi}.
2. Sample a random S ← Dn,σ conditioned on |S| ≤ 2σn.
Corrupt the parties in P ∪ S ∪ Ld.
First round. Act according to Πd.
Second round. Sample S0,S1 at random from {∅,S}, and act towards some honest parties ac-
cording to ΠS0d,0 and towards the others according to Π
S1
d,1 .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
By Equation (28) and since PrS←Dn,σ [S ≥ 2σn] ≤ α, the above adversary violates the agree-
ment of Π on input v with probability larger than α, contradicting the assumed agreement of Π. 
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